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This thesis examined the gaps in the Information Security Governance process of a non-profit 
organization based in the Nordics and identified important actions required to close the exist-
ing gaps. The maturity level of seven (7) perspectives from the ISO 27002 relevant to the non-
profit organization was assessed using the COBIT maturity model to determine the gap be-
tween the current and desired level of the organization’s governance process. Five (5) Coun-
try representatives and three (3) Managers from 5 countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Nor-
way, and Iceland) were interviewed using a structured questionnaire developed based on ISO 
27002 and COBIT maturity model. 
 
The thesis adopted a combination of qualitative and quantitative research method. The data 
collected from the interviews were used as the primary data source and a statistical repre-
sentation of the data was depicted using a Radar chart to show the current level, desired 
level specified by the non-profit organization and the desired level specified by the respond-
ents during the interview. 
 
The result of this thesis shows that the non-profit organization’s supplier service delivery 
management, incident management and information security risk management procedures 
were not in place while other perspectives such as information security policy, asset classifi-
cation, continuity planning and personnel security were not standardized based on COBIT ma-
turity model. In addition, the thesis shows the gap margin between the current and the or-
ganization’s desired maturity levels. The widest gap measured was in the organization’s sup-
plier service delivery management procedures while the lowest gap measured was in the or-
ganization’s personnel security management procedures. 
 
This thesis provided a prioritized list of needed actions to close the identified gaps in the or-
ganization’s information security governance process to achieve its desired maturity level. 
The conclusion drawn from this thesis was that the non-profit organization is vulnerable to 
potential breaches because the non-technical governance perspectives needed to secure its 
information security systems were not based on any standard practice and undefined. 
 
Finally, this thesis recommended further research of the organization’s information security 
governance process capability supported by field study to all the units in the Nordics to deter-
mine appropriate desired maturity level for each ISO 27002 perspectives related to the organ-
ization. 
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1 Introduction 
The breakthrough in the information technology has made many enterprises to be dependent 
on internet for various daily business operations, it is now possible for a new member of an 
organization to register online, make an online request for membership identification, make 
payment for membership fee, participate in an online meetings, seminars and conferences with 
just a mouse click without the need for physical presence at any of the organization’s branch. 
 
Information is an essential driving force for many enterprises because of the unarguably vast 
benefits it offers, unfortunately, its security is being systematically breached by threat agents 
for valuable exploit because of poor information security governance (henceforth ISG) which 
poses high risk on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of enterprise’s proprietary in-
formation, financial and other intangible assets.  
It appears that enterprises are helpless given the number of successful attacks lately. For in-
stance, enterprises such as Equifax, Adult Friend Finders, eBay, and others had been victims of 
data breaches by hackers with yahoo described as the biggest victim of the 21st century.  
 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot from Yle Uutiset Website 
 
In 2018, thousands of matriculation students’ information was reportedly leaked in Finland be-
cause of the security breach in the examination board’s online server. Yle Uutiset quoted Hel-
sinki Sanomat report that approximately 7,695 students’ personal information including names, 
addresses, phone numbers, study information and social security numbers was leaked. This 
raises a lot of concern about the security of personal information in other organizations. 
 
Previous information security breaches had shown that breaches are a global challenge that 
concerns both government and non-profit organizations. 
 
“If these hacks are happening to the biggest, most well-recognized and well-funded businesses 
and nations, then what chances do the relatively smaller cyber targets have at protecting them-
selves?” Donaldson et al. 2015 
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Gelles (2015) quoted John Chambers who states that there is no completely secure data centre 
or network that has not experienced information security incident, meaning no enterprise is 
completely secure, and the number of attacks is exponentially growing. Inadequate ISG often 
leads to inconsistencies in systems configuration and it has been identified as a major cause of 
the security incidents experienced by many enterprises.  
 
The value of information cannot be overemphasized. According to the report of a global bench-
mark study conducted by Ponemon Institute in 2017, the average total cost of the data breaches 
was $3.62 million representing a 10% drop from the average total cost in 2016. The report 
valued the cost of each lost data containing sensitive information at $141 in 2017 serving as a 
multiplier for the financial estimation of every data loss by an organization. 
 
Many enterprises appear to be secured and protected because of the investment in technology, 
processes, and people used to protect enterprise’s information assets and other business assets, 
against disclosure from unauthorised users, improper modification, and denial of access when-
ever the information is required, but security breaches are still hardly not recorded in a week. 
 
While many enterprises heavily invest in the deployment of sophisticated IT infrastructures and 
technical solutions to protect their information assets, they failed to provide effective govern-
ance and identify gaps in their enterprise information security program which in most situations 
have legal, financial, and reputational consequences especially, when the confidentiality, in-
tegrity, or availability of information is compromised. 
 
An effective ISG may be impossible without the absolute commitment of the senior manage-
ment of an enterprise to complement the technical measures such as firewalls, biometric, In-
trusion Detection Systems (IDS), server isolation and backups often deployed to mitigate the 
threats to information – by providing leadership for the protection of enterprise’s information 
assets, assigning responsibilities, providing accountability and strategic direction to mitigate 
information security risk to an acceptable level. 
 
Governance like any other social science term has no universal definition. However, this thesis 
defines governance as the set of responsibilities and practices performed by the senior man-
agement specifically board and executive management with the objective of realizing benefits, 
ensuring risk optimization, and verifying that organization resources are responsibly used by 
optimizing cost. This includes practices and activities aimed at providing strategic direction for 
information security (Whitman & Mattord 2016).  
Senior management of an enterprise needs to identify a combination of control measures and 
best practices based on profound ISG framework and standards that allows governance maturity 
level assessment. 
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There are different models for measuring the maturity of enterprise ISG, but which model will 
provide an integrated approach for a non-profit organization is still a matter of concern. 
Information security has both technical and non-technical governance perspectives, however, 
evaluation of the technical perspectives is outside the scope of this thesis rather this thesis will 
focus on the non-technical governance perspectives specified by the ISO/IEC 27000 family of 
standards and COBIT framework. The main purpose of this thesis is to determine the gaps in a 
non-profit organization ISG process and identify the important issues to be considered in devel-
oping a roadmap for closing the prevailing gaps. 
 
Therefore, this thesis is a suitable guide for the board of directors, senior management, country 
manager/representatives and stakeholders providing strategic leadership for the information 
security of organization X which is the anonymous name of the non-profit organization used as 
a case study for this thesis. 
 
lastly, it is important to clarify some of the ambiguity on what is considered an enterprise. 
Harmer (2013) clarifies that an enterprise is a term that describes a range of different organi-
zations including corporations established for commercial purposes which may or may not be 
listed on the stock exchange, public sector organization such as a local or national government 
establishment, or a non-governmental organization established for a non-profit purpose. There-
fore, these two terms; enterprise and organization can be interchangeably used as a generic 
term that covers government, private, and non-government organizations. 
1.1 Research Question 
The research questions for this study are coined in accordance to the research interest of Or-
ganization X. The aim is to point the research towards providing answers to the following 
questions which are considered vital to the creation of organization X’s information security 
governance roadmap: 
1. What is the gap in the Organization X’s information security governance? 
2. What is the current level of information security governance of Organization X? 
3. What is the desired level of the Information security governance of Organiza-
tion X?  
2 Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, previous literature will be reviewed to provide theoretical background for this 
study. 
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2.1 Information Security Governance(ISG) 
ISG is an established component of corporate governance because ISG is a subset of enterpri-
ses’ corporate governance (Von Solms R. & Von Solms S. H. 2006). More specifically, corpo-
rate governance is defined as the objectives, policies, processes, and strategies for control-
ling and directing an enterprise (Kearney & Kurger 2013), this includes enterprise ISG which is 
often viewed as a set of technical issues than corporate governance responsibilities (Swindle 
& Conner 2004). 
 
Brotby (2008) conceptually describes ISG as a process governed by Senior Management, Execu-
tive Management and Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) to facilitate the strategic 
alignment of organization’s business objectives and information security objectives. Brotby 
(2008) further identifies the business strategy, information security strategy, security poli-
cies, and standards as drivers of organization’s strategic alignment.  
 
Gelbstein (2012) summarizes the purpose of ISG under three key important functions which 
include; evaluating, directing and monitoring organization’s information security to ensure 
business objectives requirements are met, identify information risk owners, achieve assu-
rance integration and reduce non-compliance and litigation risks with sustainable confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability. 
 
ISG is not perceived as an important issue in many not-for-profit organizations. This is evident 
in the outcome of a study conducted in 2005 by Aberdeen Group in the not-for profit sector 
which revealed that ISG is not included in the top 10 areas of concern for board members and 
executives. The audit tried to rank the perceived importance of ISG in the not-for-profit sec-
tor.  
 
Some factors that may contribute to the low perceived importance of governance includes; 
ineffective security policies,lack of executive interest, poorly defined risk management, rapid 
changes in technological innovations, poor estimation of the value of information, boundaries 
of information security, poorly defined roles and responsibilities, and Bring Your Own Techno-
logies such as  laptops, iPods, flash drives etc. 
 
Setting boundaries on information security involve the management’s direction on defining 
privileges for accessing information based on roles and responsibility which is often conside-
red as IT department responsibility or service provider’s responsibility depending on the or-
ganization. The need for regular cost reductions and the resources to mitigate risk in a busi-
ness environment in which threat landscape is consistently changing often demands senior 
management intervention in ensuring that risk acceptance falls within the organization’s risk 
appetite. 
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Without a policy, standards, and blueprints organizations may find it difficult to meet the in-
formation security need of various stakeholders (Whitman & Matthod, 2016). Similarly, failure 
to develop an information security strategy can negatively impact organization’s ability to ac-
hieve the objective of strategy which is to achieve the desired state of security. 
 
 
Figure 2: Pyramid of Information Security Strategy Documents 
According to Osborne (2006), an organization’s security policy is a list that dictates operati-
onal standards and procedures by clearly specifying the do’s and don’t. The policy serves as a 
tactical means of specifying business rules and guidelines that ensure compliance with an or-
ganization’s strategic direction.  
 
An organization’s information security policy may address different aspect such as computer 
ethics policy, password protection policy, clean desk policy,technology disposal policy, physi-
cal security policy, electronic mail policy, removable media policy, remote access policy, in-
ternet usage policy, mobile device policy, software policy, network management policy and 
acceptable use policy.  
 
ISG largely depends on sound policies backed with a suitable degree of authority and a means 
of auditing compliance and violations. It contains a high-level statement of principles gover-
ning enterprise information security. An enterprise security culture is often characterized by 
the information security policy statements. An enterprise with strong command and control 
security culture usually use strong imperative statement in their information security policies. 
For example, an enterprise information security policy may require all users to separate per-
sonal files from work-related ones using strong imperative, unambiguous and concise state-
ment to establish intent: 
Policy
Standards
Guidelines
Procedures
Baselines
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All users must separate personal files from work-related files and stored in a separate direc-
tory marked personal (source: Users rules of Laurea IT services). 
 
The underlined word in the example of an imperative policy statement above is only used in 
an enterprise with strong command and security culture. However, there are other subtle and 
persuasive phrases that can be used depending on the enterprise security culture (BERR 
2012).  
According to (Whitman & Matthod, 2016) establishment of an enterprise’s information secu-
rity policies, standards and practices are the ideal starting point for the creation of informa-
tion security program, such creation must consider the enterprise’s security architecture and 
select a detailed information security blueprints. Delligent Corporation (2016) suggests cons-
tant assessment and measuring of ISG to identify policies that are working and vice versa. 
Also, measuring and assessing organizations’ Information security policies can promote identi-
fication of policy violators and compliants. 
 
But, how is it possible to measure an organization’s security policies that have not existed or 
been documented? Suppose it does exist and it has been documented yet it would be impor-
tant to question the level of stakeholders’ awareness of such policies within the organization 
and their ability to access it. More importantly, to identify how consistent is the policy across 
the organization. Most importantly, how the policies have been reviewed by the senior mana-
gement and board members to address the changes in the threat landscape of the organiza-
tion. 
 
Usually, the standard gives detailed technical description or specification needed when per-
forming a specific function (Osborne 2006 pg. 24). Standards are designed to provide policies 
with support and strategic direction by specifying mandatory activities, actions, rules, or reg-
ulations (Peltier 2002). Enterprise information security policies are usually based on stand-
ards, frameworks and best practices developed by International organizations such as ISO/IEC 
27000 family of standards, BSI IT security baseline, COBIT, ANSI, FIPS, GASSP, ISF, ITIL etc. to 
help an organization achieve internal governance and reduce information security risk. Stand-
ard specifies behavior, processes, configurations, technologies needed for enterprise infor-
mation security. 
Also, the adoption of standards, frameworks and best practices can positively influence infor-
mation security regulatory compliance (Turner & McKnight 2008). 
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2.2 Information Security Organizational Structure 
The structure of an organization is an important success factor in its ISG, it focuses on organ-
izing and accounting of organization’s business units and departments. To a high extent, ISG 
is dependent on the leadership and organizational structures that safeguard information (NIST 
2006). In 2018 global state of security survey, research findings reveal that only 44% of re-
spondents confirm the active participation of boards in the organizations’ overall security 
strategy.  
  
Failure to coordinate and localize authority by the board of directors and/or senior manage-
ment may pose challenges for organization-wide compliance on policy approval, control moni-
toring, performance metric reviewing and risk reduction. This may influence lower-level per-
sonnel non-abiding tendencies. To avoid non-abiding tendencies, organizations must establish 
top-down information security strategy (PwC GSISS 2018). 
 
Board of directors and senior management of organizations need to periodically request and 
review the result of Business Impact Analysis (BIA) and other risk-related assessments to iden-
tify key organizational assets and determine criticality and dependencies in the daily business 
operation. 
According to NIST handbook, 2006, ISG structure can be divided into two basic models; the 
centralized and decentralized models. 
 
 
Figure 3: Baran's Centralized and Decentralized model of organizational structure Source Bo-
rowski Craig  
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The centralized model is characterized by the central corporate governance of policies, pro-
cedures, process, and controls that define ISG among disparate business units. Cost savings, 
process efficiencies, standardization and improved value delivery are some of the benefits 
derivable from a centralized model. 
 
Conversely, individual business units’ governance of information security programs character-
izes the decentralized model. The advantage of this model is the possibility for each business 
units to autonomously produce policies that are tailored to their specific business model and 
operating environment. 
 
Organizations with extreme diversity in terms of business operations across different geo-
graphical locations can adopt the hybrid model which is a combination of the centralized and 
decentralized models. Especially, where organization’s policies, procedures, processes, and 
standards are not in conformity with the local legislation and regulatory requirements of 
some business units, the full compliance of the centralized model maybe partially suspended 
to the extent of its applicability in that business unit and a decentralized model may be acti-
vated in this situation. 
2.3 Expected Outcomes  
ISACA (2010) identifies six (6) major outcomes that an effective ISG should achieve, these in-
clude; strategic alignment, risk management, performance measurement, value delivery, re-
source management and assurance process integration.  
 
   
2.3.1 Strategic Alignment 
Strategic alignment between business and IT is important to improve organization’s business 
performance (Sabherwal & Chan 2001). It involves careful consideration of how to achieve the 
strategic fit and functional integration of business strategy, information technology strategy, 
organizational infrastructure and processes, and information security infrastructure. Hender-
son and Venkertraman (1999) Strategic Alignment Model (SAM) provides a theoretical under-
standing of the Business and IT Alignment. 
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Figure 4: Henderson and Venkertraman (1999) Strategic Alignment Model (SAM)  
As it can be seen in Figure 4 above, the model consists of four quadrants which are linked to-
gether by the strategic fit and functional integration linkage. The vertical linkage is the func-
tional integration and the horizontal linkage is the strategic fit. The first and second quad-
rants of the SAM model shows Business Strategy and IT Strategy as an external domain which 
should be articulately linked with the internal domain – the combination of Organizational in-
frastructure and Processes, and Information System Infrastructure – to achieve strategic align-
ment (Henderson and Venkertraman 1999). 
 
Business strategy is mainly concerned with the mission, vision, and objectives of an organiza-
tion. IS strategy deals with the use of applications or software’s and other information tech-
nology means to support an organization business objective (Chew & Gottschalk 2009). The 
attainment of strategic alignment can be jeopardized when IS/IT Strategy is not concurrently 
planned (Cassidy 2006). Therefore, an organization’s management should integrate the infor-
mation security practices into the organization’s business processes through the expansion of 
corporate governance policies and controls to cover the objectives of the information security 
process (Whitman & Mattord 2016). 
 
According to Hann & Weber (1996), IS/IT Strategic planning is a set of activities aimed to-
wards achieving the following objectives: 
1. Identifying organizational problems and recognizing opportunities where IS/IT might 
be effectively applied. 
2. Finding the appropriate resources needed to enable successful usage of IS/IT to pro-
vide a solution to the identified opportunities and problems. 
3. Developing strategies and procedures that will allow IS/IT to be successfully applied 
to the identified opportunities and problems. 
4. Establishing monitoring and bonding of IT managers to ensure their actions are harmo-
nized with the goals of their senior management. 
Business 
Strategy IT Strategy
Organizational 
Infrastructure 
and Process
IS 
Infrastructure
Strategic Fit 
Functional Fit 
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5. Resolving problems associated with gains and losses from unforeseen circumstances 
will be distributed among senior management and IT Manager 
6. Determining the extent of decision right to be delegated to the IT Manager. 
 
In addition, any information security strategy should be developed with the main objective of 
complementing business goal through responsible management and control of the information 
security risk of the organization (Pironti 2010). 
2.3.2  Information Security Risk Management 
Information risk management is one of the major outcomes of an effective information secu-
rity governance (ISACA, 2010). In theory, a risk is the probability of a threat taking advantage 
of a vulnerability to cause harm to an organization’s asset. More specifically, it is the proba-
bility of the interaction of threats and vulnerabilities acting against an organization. 
 
In mathematical term according to (Jones & Ashenden 2005, 186); 
Risk = Threat X Vulnerability X Impact (Asset Value)   
The above mathematical term simply means that: 
Risk = 0      when either threat, vulnerability, or impact = 0 
Risk = Likelihood (probability) X Impact  
 
Therefore, the likelihood of a risk is greatly dependent on the availability of threat agent (at-
tacker), vulnerability (weakness), and impact. The notion of a zero risk does not exist as or-
ganizations are incessantly faced with various threats emanating from recruiting, outsourcing, 
collaborating, manufacturing, marketing, and business location (Whitman & Mattord 2016). In 
simple term, the vulnerability is synonymous with weakness, it allows threat agents to ex-
plore or compromise an organization’s information assets. Vulnerabilities can arise from hu-
man failures, failure in physical security systems or technological flaws which threat agent 
can quickly explore to cause harm to the information systems or process of an organization. 
 
Just as vulnerabilities can take many forms, so too can threats, A threat can be technological, 
human or force majeure when it is viewed from the threat agent perspective. Also, a threat 
can be deliberate or accidental depending on the threat motivation. In addition, it can be in-
ternal or external when threat source is the basis of categorization. 
 
The growth of an organization depends on how the management can effectively manage risk 
and protect the organization’s business interest which makes risk management a critical or-
ganization’s success factor (Obicci & Adoko 2017). Unfortunately, most organizations are not 
only clueless about the profile of their information security risk, they also lack the ability to 
assess it because there are many who share the notion that it is impossible to calculate it. 
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However, Touhill G.J & Touhill C. J. (2014) believe that some of the same techniques used to 
calculate risk in other sectors can be used to assess information security risk. 
 
Quantitative and qualitative risk assessment is the popular techniques used in other sectors. 
In theory, quantitative risk assessment is based on numbers and complex mathematics, and 
qualitative risk assessment is based on scenarios and items ranking such as high, medium, or 
low. 
 
For an organization to manage its information security risk effectively; first, the value of as-
sets need to be determined. This value is often more than the capital cost. Asset value can be 
calculated based on the total cost of replacing the assets and the cost of possible embarrass-
ment the organization incurred, and the cost of business loss that might be recorded by losing 
the asset. Mere destruction, corruption, theft, modification, removal, disclosure, or interrup-
tion of information, perhaps web codes or system log files or other resources could damage 
an organization’s reputation. 
 
 Information Asset Classification 
According to ISO 27001, information assets can include classified information such as elec-
tronic documents, paper documents, verbally transmitted information, email, information 
stored on databases and storage media which can be classified in one of the four levels de-
scribed by Kosutic (2014): 
1. Public: This is an information asset that can be accessed by everyone within and out-
side the organization including people that are not members of the organization. 
2. Internal use: This is an information asset that is limited to internal use. Accessibility 
of this information asset is not allowed for external bodies. This information classifi-
cation level has the lowest level of confidentiality. 
3. Restricted: This information asset is only accessible to selected members of an organ-
ization based on their need-to-know and job function.  
4. Confidential: Top secrets such as trade secret are classified confidential and should 
be treated with the highest level of confidentiality within an organization 
An asset can be classified into six classes according to ISO 27002 in table 1 below, the first 
class of asset often referred to as the information asset class; it comprises of printed infor-
mation, posted or transmitted information, written or spoken information, information shown 
in films/videos, electronically stored or transmitted information. 
 
The second classification known as the Software assets comprise of operating systems e.g. 
Windows, Linux Operating system etc., applications built for web or mobile usage, develop-
ment tools and all other utilities. 
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Table 1: Asset Classification Based on ISO 27002 
The third asset class based on ISO 27002 is the physical assets and hardware which includes 
assets such as computers, laptops, iPad, PDAs, mobile phones, USB sticks, CD- ROMs and 
backup tapes as shown in the table. 
 
Fourth asset class includes assets that are considered as services such as heating and cooling 
services for the data center/ server room, Internet subscription, lighting, and other IT infra-
structures related services.  
 
The fifth class of assets are the people involved in the daily operation of the enterprises, it 
includes all key personnel as well as their various skills, qualifications, and experiences which 
should be regarded and classified as an asset for the enterprise.  
Information 
Asset 
Software Physical Assets 
and Hardware 
Services People Intangibles 
Printed In-
formation 
 
Written or 
posted infor-
mation 
 
Information 
Shown in 
film/Video 
 
Spoken Con-
versation 
 
Electroni-
cally stored 
information 
Electroni-
cally trans-
mitted data 
 
Operating 
Systems 
 
Applications 
 
 
Develop-
ment tools 
 
Utilities 
Computer 
 
 
Lap-
tops/iPad/PDAs 
 
 
 
Mobile 
phones/Pod 
 
 
 
USB sticks, CD-
ROMs, and backup 
tapes 
 
 
Copper cables 
Fiber optics 
Server Infrastruc-
tures 
Air-condi-
tioning sys-
tems 
 
 
 
 
Heating 
 
Lighting 
 
 
Internet 
subscription 
Key person-
nel 
 
Qualifica-
tions 
 
 
Skills 
 
 
experience 
Intellectual 
Property 
 
trademarks 
 
 
 
Brand Image 
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The Intangible class is the last class of the six classes of asset based on the ISO 27002, This 
class of asset covers all intellectual properties belonging to an enterprise irrespective of its 
size and type, brand images and trademarks.  
Assets are classified according to their value and exposure to enable sensible allocation of 
budgets and resources where they matter most. 
 
For the board and senior management to effectively manage organization’s information assets 
and the associated risk a well-defined risk management policy should be established. This is 
because the ultimate responsibility of the board and senior management is to ensure that ef-
fective risk management and measures are in place to combat risk. The board can specify the 
organization’s risk tolerance based on its risk appetite to determine when risk should be ac-
cepted, reduced, avoided, or transferred in the organization’s risk management policy. 
 
Information risk management consists of many processes such that an evaluation of its ma-
turity becomes important. This maturity can be evaluated through the assessment of the or-
ganization’s current risk management capacity (Jones & Ashenden 2005). 
 
2.4 Determining Gap in Organization’s ISG 
Developing a roadmap for an organization’s ISG requires frequent or annual analysis of the 
gaps between the current and desired levels to identify organizational perspectives that need 
improvement as the business environment changes (Brotby 2008). An efficient means of meas-
uring security performance is to identify gaps and devise improvement plan by measuring the 
organization’s maturity using Capability Maturity Model (Szatmary 2015). According to Vol-
chkov (2013) measuring and assessing organizations’ security investments is a necessity to jus-
tify the return on security investment.  
 
However, the fear of what gap analysis might reveal has made many organizations be unwill-
ing to conduct it. Gap analysis provides an overview of organization’s strengths and weak-
nesses which highlights what an organization does right, and vice versa (Shaw 2012).  
 
The advantages organization stands to gain from determining gaps in ISG process are not lim-
ited to its ability to save time and money on irrelevant expenses usually expanded on capabil-
ities that already exist within the organization. Effective gap analysis can help organizations 
to discover regulatory gaps by identifying specific compliance requirement detailed in the 
regulatory document.  
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Failure to regularly conduct a gap analysis to determine and prioritize activities that an or-
ganization can correct to achieve its strategic objective might present an overwhelmingly un-
expected gap in the organization’s ISG process. 
 
Ghaznavi-Zadeh (2018) suggests six important steps that can be used to determine gap and 
build a roadmap for an organization’s information security program these include selecting 
standard framework e.g. ISO 27000, proper understanding of the business objectives and iden-
tifying relevant control perspectives from the standard related to the organization’s business 
processes. Also, customizing the control based on business requirements, determining gap by 
performing maturity assessment and lastly, developing a program to close the gap in the con-
trols. 
2.5 Determining Desired and Current Level of Organization’s Information Security 
Predetermination of organization’s state of information security often enables adequate de-
velopment of information security strategy. Organizations can achieve this, by envisaging and 
determining future conditions peculiar to their information security. 
 
The desired state of information security can be achieved by combining different approaches 
such as capability maturity models, balanced scorecards, information security standards(ISO) 
27001:2013 and 27002:2013, and architectural approach because a single approach may not 
satisfactorily address organization’s information security needs.  
2.5.1 Capability Maturity Model Approach 
A way to characterize the performance and capability of an organization is to measure its ca-
pability or maturity. Nath (2016), outlines cost overrun, missed or closed deadlines, poor mo-
rale, quality management problems, customers’ complaints, and inability to repeat recorded 
success as some of the consequences of lack of organization’s capability.  
In the last decades, over 150 capability maturity models have evolved (de Bruin et al. 2005). 
This is because of the importance of the capability maturity model as a visualization tool for 
adopting processes and standards, and benchmarking of progress made by organizations 
(Becker et al. 2009). 
 
The information security management maturity model (ISM3), NIST information security ma-
turity model developed under the Program Review for Information Security Assistance 
(PRISMA), and Steven Woodhouse maturity model for Information Security Management sys-
tems capability and maturity assessment are among several other models that have been de-
veloped to measure organization’s capability (Karokola 2011 et al.). 
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The ISM3 proposes five (5) maturity level dimensions for information security; Undefined, De-
fined, Managed, Controlled, and Optimized. Meaning, the capability of an organization’s ISG 
process can be assessed as undefined based on the maturity levels when the governance pro-
cess is undefined but implementable. For example, an organization may have usable infor-
mation security governance process which is not defined. 
 
The defined maturity level is attained when the ISG process is documented and used. ISO 
Standards’ process auditing requires organizations to attain “managed level” of maturity to 
pass capability assessment because organizations should be able to fix and improve defined 
information security management processes at this level. 
 
The ISG process is better managed and accurate prediction of milestones and resources is 
achieved when the organization attains a controlled level of maturity. Process improvement 
and control has been identified as key benefits organizations can derive from optimized ma-
turity level which provides an opportunity for cost savings on resources (ISM3 2007). According 
to (Karokola et.al. 2011), the limitation of this model is that it does not directly measure se-
curity risk and it does not sufficiently address non-technical security issues. 
 
In a similar dimension, NIST (2007) developed a maturity model for the evaluation of infor-
mation security maturity where five (5) maturity levels of dimensions are named like the ISM3. 
In the NIST maturity dimension; policies, procedure, implementation, testing, and integration 
are the five likely levels of organization’s information security maturity. This model is limited 
by its failure to address non-technical security services. 
 
In another dimension, Steven Woodhouse (2008) argues that the current existing maturity 
models are not suitable for the assessment of lower levels of maturity below one. Therefore, 
he proposed a unique maturity model with the following maturity levels dimension; Func-
tional, Technical, Operational, Managed, and Strategic. Steve Woodhouse maturity level di-
mension consists of additional four layers namely; Negligent (0), Obstructive (-1), Arrogant (-
2) and Subversive (-3) that are inconsistent with other maturity level dimensions. 
 
The increasing capability gaps in the previous models are adequately addressed in the Capa-
bility Maturity Model Integration (CMMI). This model provides an adaptive framework designed 
based on best practices for organizations to promote behavior that leads to improved perfor-
mance. The CMMI consists of five (5) maturity levels for the evaluation of organization’s infor-
mation security maturity; Initial, Managed, Defined, Quantitatively Managed, and Optimizing. 
 
The highest maturity level in the CMMI is the optimizing level characterized by organizations’ 
focus on continuous improvement and ability to respond to change and opportunities. High 
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maturity indicates organization’s commitment to excellence, high quality, and low-risk infor-
mation security. 
Organizations can expect to move from the initial level of the CMMI by identifying areas of 
improvements and correcting these areas before integrating the solutions across its business 
units (Nath 2016). 
 
In Table 2 below, the two COBIT models are different in terms of attributes but can be ap-
plied using the same data collection to determine specific gap that needs improvement focus 
in an organization. However, the COBIT Process Capability Model provides an improved focus 
and more rigorous process capability assessment than the COBIT Maturity Model.  
 
Information 
Security Ma-
turity Mod-
els 
Maturity Levels 
-3 - 0 1 2 3 4 5 
ISM3  X Undefined Defined Managed Con-
trolled 
Optimized 
NIST 
(PRISMA) 
X Policies Procedures Implemen-
tation 
Testing Integrat-
ing 
Steven 
Woodhouse 
 
 
Negligent 
-1: Obstructive 
-2: Arrogant 
-3: Subversive 
Functional Technical Opera-
tional 
Managed Strategic 
CMMI X Initial Managed Defined Quantita-
tively 
Managed 
Optimiz-
ing 
COBIT Pro-
cess Capa-
bility Model 
COBIT 5 
 
Incomplete Performed Managed Established Predicta-
ble 
Optimiz-
ing 
COBIT Ma-
turity 
Generic 
Model 
Non-existence Initial 
/Ad-hoc 
Repeata-
ble but in-
tuitive 
Defined Managed 
and 
Measura-
ble 
Optimized 
 
Table 2: Summary of Maturity Models 
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COBIT 5 maturity model is based on ISO/IEC 15504 standard and it is based on six maturity 
levels. This maturity model provides powerful and robust capability evaluation approach as 
compared to the other maturity models as it does not only give descriptive statement per ma-
turity (De Haes et. al 2013).  
2.5.2 Balanced Scorecard Approach 
Another approach for implementing organizations’ information security is the balanced score-
card. It consists of four management perspectives often used to monitor and evaluate busi-
ness processes.  
 
According to Kaplan & Norton (1996), the four perspectives of balanced scorecards for profit-
oriented organizations are financial, customer, learning and innovation, and internal process. 
Balanced scorecard financial perspective allows organizations to optimize finance and in-
crease profit by expanding revenues and keeping cost down. The customer perspectives focus 
on customer satisfaction and retention as means of maintaining organization’s reputation.  
 
The way organizations’ information security processes are managed based on the expectation 
of all stakeholders can be recognized from the internal perspective. 
The learning and innovation perspectives identify how organizations’ staff cultures, capabili-
ties, and skills can be nurtured for receptive learning of current and emerging technologies 
through training, mentoring, and tutoring. 
 
Non-profit organizations’ balanced scorecard is completely different from the profit-oriented 
organizations. Although, it is equally based on four perspectives; mission, financial recipient, 
internal processes, and people. 
The main driver of non-profit organizations’ balanced scorecard is the achievement of organi-
zations’ mission. Organizations must consider the beneficiaries of all service offerings to ac-
complish their mission. Organizations largely depend on people with specific capabilities, 
skills, and culture to drive some internal processes such as fundraising, financial manage-
ment, and information security management required for daily operations (Weaver 2016). 
2.5.3 Architectural Approach 
Traditional Model 
Traditionally, the information security strategy implementation is normally forecasted based 
on the organization’s goals or mission or vision. The forecast is often based on past events 
that occurred in the organization. The main pitfall of the traditional information security 
model is the heavy reliance on past events without consideration for the current data or 
changes in industry requirement, making them less adaptive in most organizations. 
  18 
 
 
McKinsey Model 
In 1980s, due to the limitations of the traditional models, McKinsey consultants decided to 
develop an alternative and adaptive model known as the McKinsey Model. This model is based 
on the theory that the performance of an organization is dependent on how well the seven 
elements of the model are aligned and mutually reinforced.  
The McKinsey model emphasis on the need for the harmonization of strategy, systems, shared 
values, style, skills, and staff often to achieve organizational objectives (Ravanfar 2015). 
These elements are divided into soft and hard parts. Strategy, structure, and system form the 
hard part of the McKinsey model while style, staff, skills, and shared values represent the soft 
part of the model. 
 
The McKinsey is a Senior Management and Board member’s tool for determining their organi-
zation’s strategic alignment. It serves as a monitoring and assessment tool for the determina-
tion of internal changes in the organization. The model is commonly used to facilitate change 
management, acquisition, and merger-related issues in an organization, implement a new 
strategy, and identify future changes within the organization.  
 
An organization needs to develop strategic plan to gain a sustainable competitive advantage 
over a short or long-term period. The long-term strategic plan is often recommended for or-
ganizations instead of the short term except in situations where the short-term strategic plan 
can be easily aligned with other 6 elements of the McKinsey model. 
 
Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA) Model  
In 1995, a generic layered model and a methodology based on Zachman’s taxonomy for devel-
oping risk-driven enterprise information security architectures and for delivering security in-
frastructure solutions that support critical business initiatives known as SABSA was developed 
(SABSA homepage).  
 
Successful implementation of the strategic program of information security architecture 
within any organization can be initiated with SABSA. The SABSA model uses enterprise secu-
rity architecture approach to address challenges such as poor strategic considerations often 
experienced in organizations during the design, acquisition, and installation of information 
security solutions (Sherwood et al. 2009). 
 
According to (Sherwood et al. 2009), the model consists of six layers representing six differ-
ent views; the business, architect’s, designer’s, builder’s, and tradesman’s and service  
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Figure 5: SABSA Architechtural Model Reprinted with the Permission of SABSA Institute 
 
manager’s view representing contextual, conceptual, logical, physical, component and secu-
rity service management architectures as shown in Figure 5 above. 
The security service management architecture is vertically placed because security service 
management issue can be experienced at any of the first five layers. 
An organization can create a completely customized information security architecture by us-
ing the SABSA matrix with the model. To create this, an organization needs to provide an-
swers to six standard questions asked about information security strategy at each layer of the 
model.  
In the contextual view layer, an organization deals with business requirement analysis and 
identification of “what” assets the security architecture would be protecting. The answers 
provided in this layer are taken into consideration in the design and operation of the security  
architecture. Contextual layer enables business security processes often implemented by the 
governance and management structure to help manage risk and protect businesses. The over-
all concept that can be used to meet the business requirement identified in the contextual 
layer is created at the conceptual view layer. In this layer, Senior management considers 
“why” the architecture is required for the protection of assets.  
 
In the design view layer, the business is viewed as a system that needs the logical flow of con-
trols where risk management policies and security domains for information assets protection 
are implemented.  
 
More importantly, an organization needs to consider “how” the security architecture would 
protect the asset at the logical layer. Additionally, an organization might consider who would 
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be involved in asset protection at the physical layer, where and when to apply security initia-
tives for assets protection needs to be considered at the component layer, and security ser-
vice management layer. 
 
2.6 COBIT 5 Framework 
Over the years, COBIT has evolved from IT audit to the governance of enterprise IT. In 1991, 
COBIT was developed by Erik Guldentop and 34 other people who had the invitation to con-
duct a research to device European IT audit initiative because United States was the only 
source of IT audit knowledge during this period.  
 
In 1996, COBIT 1 which is the first version of COBIT was issued where COBIT was initially an 
acronym for Control Objectives for Information and related Technology. However, the term 
COBIT is not an acronym anymore because COBIT 5 is now a business framework for the gov-
ernance and management of an organization’s IT (Harmer 2013). 
 
The first version of COBIT known as COBIT1 was an IT audit framework which later became an 
IT control framework when COBIT2 was issued in 1998. COBIT3 was issued in the year 2000 as 
an IT management framework. But the governance framework started with the evolution of 
COBIT4.0/4.1 in the year 2005 followed by COBIT 5 the governance of enterprise IT frame-
work which was introduced in the year 2012. 
 
The COBIT 5 was issued by ISACA, a global business technology association as a comprehensive 
framework for the alignment of any enterprise business issues through effective governance 
and management of Information Technology based on globally accepted best practices and 
models.  
 
The COBIT 5 framework provided five (5) principles for an effective governance and manage-
ment of Information Technology, which includes; meeting stakeholders need, covering the en-
terprise end-to-end, applying a single-integrated framework, enabling an integrated ap-
proach, and separating governance from management. 
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Figure 6: COBIT 5 Principles Source: COBIT 5 A Business Framework For The Governance and 
Management of Enterprise IT-Figure 2 
 
Figure 6 above shows the five principles of COBIT for the governance and management of en-
terprise IT. According to ISACA 2012, the first principle of COBIT5, emphases the reason for 
the existence of an Enterprise which is basically to create value for stakeholders. Stakehold-
ers are classified into internal and external stakeholders. The internal stakeholders include; 
Board members, Business owners, Chief executive officers, Business Managers, Risk Managers, 
Chief Information Managers, Human resource, IT managers, Security Manager etc while the 
external stakeholders include; Business Suppliers, shareholders, customers, regulatory body, 
external auditors, trade union etc. 
 
An enterprise, commercial or non-commercial engages many stakeholders with governance 
objective of creating value through benefit realization, risk optimization, and resource opti-
mization. Value creation involves realizing benefits -financial for private enterprises, public 
service for government establishments- at an optimal risk management level while optimizing 
the resource cost of an enterprise by using goals cascade to translate stakeholders need to 
actionable strategy. 
 
The second principle provides an end-to-end governance approach for the integration of the 
enterprise IT governance system into enterprise governance using enablers such as structures, 
frameworks, processes, practices, and other enterprise’s resources -including people, infor-
COBIT5
Meeting 
Stakeholders 
Need
Covering the 
Enterprise 
End-to-End
Applying a 
single 
integrated 
framework
Enabling a 
Holistic 
approach
Seperating 
Governance 
from 
Management
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mation, and other IT infrastructures. The governance scope of the end-to-end governance ap-
proach must be defined and aligned with the enterprise objective (Value creation), govern-
ance enablers, and  
 
3 Research Methodology 
This thesis has used both qualitative and quantitative research methodology also known as 
mixed methods because the combination provides a better understanding of research prob-
lems than a single approach (Terell 2012). 
3.1 Primary Data Source 
Primary data was collected through structured interviews. Josselson (2013) defines interview 
as a shared product of the interviewer (writer), and the interviewee (the target group) dis-
cuss and how they conduct the discussions together.  In this case, the target group for inter-
views were the country representatives and managers representing Organization X in Finland, 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. The main justification for the selection of this target 
group was because they were the process and procedure owners providing management su-
pervision for the perspectives under assessment in the organization. 
Respondents Position Unit/Country 
1 Country Representative Sweden 
2 Country Representative Finland 
3 ICT Manager  All Units 
4 Country Representative Denmark 
5 Country Representative Iceland 
6 Secretary All Units 
7 Project Manager All units 
8 Country Representative  Norway 
Table 3 List of Country Representatives and Managers Interviewed 
 
The structured interview was found suitable for this research because the interviewer needed 
answers to series of the same questions from the respondents collected in an orderly and sys-
tematic way. The list of respondents interviewed is shown in Table 3. 
 
According to (Cohen & Crabtree 2006), the response category of a structured interview is of-
ten limited, and the questions are mostly created before the interview. Generally, structured 
interviews are characterized by standardized ordering and phrasing of questions which are 
consistently maintained from one interview to another during the same research exercise. On 
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this basis, a questionnaire was created before the interview to serve as a research instru-
ment.  
 
The interview questionnaire was developed to focus on Seven (7) important perspectives from 
the ISO/IEC 27002 related to Organization X using COBIT Maturity level dimensions (please see 
appendix 2 for a sample of the questionnaire). Based on the predefined attributes of each 
maturity levels from 0 to 5, the following perspectives were discussed in the interview held in 
Helsinki in March 2018: 
• Security policy; respondents were asked to describe their organization’s information 
security policy 
• Asset management: respondents were asked to describe their organization’s asset 
classification processes and procedures 
• Information Security Incidents: respondents were asked to choose an option that best 
describes their organization’s information security incident management 
• Information security risk management: respondents had the option to choose a state-
ment that best described their organization’s security culture. 
• Supplier Service Delivery Management: Each respondent was given an opportunity to 
choose a statement that best described their organization’s service level agreement 
management on information systems acquisition development and maintenance. 
• Continuity Planning: In this section of the questionnaire respondents were asked to 
choose an option that best described their organization’s continuity planning  
• Personnel Security: This is the final section of the questionnaire where respondents 
were asked to choose a statement that best described their organization’s personnel 
security practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Sample of a section from the interview questionnaire 
 
The sample of a section from the questionnaire used for the interview is shown in Figure 7. 
All the seven (7) ISO 27002 perspectives were measured using the COBIT maturity levels as 
shown in Figure 7. The respondents can only choose one option from the six (6) available op-
tions. Each option represents the attribute(s) associated with the COBIT maturity level used 
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to assess the current maturity level. The desired level of each respondent under each per-
spective was also requested to be provided in the space where respondents were asked to 
specify their desired level based on COBIT maturity level 0 to 5. 
 
During the interviews, the interviewer provided the questionnaire to each respondent, read 
out and explained the questions for discussion before the respondents could choose an option 
considering the attributes in the posters used to explain the levels of maturity. The option 
and the desired level chosen by each respondent was recorded by the interviewer on the 
questionnaire.  
 
The data collected under each perspective were recorded on the excel document in Appendix 
3. The column 1 of Appendix 3 consists the names of respondents which is numbered 1 to 8 
representing the total number of people interviewed. In Appendix 3, the seven (7) ISO per-
spectives are presented in column 2 to 8, the responses from each respondent were recorded 
in rows under each perspective from row 2 to 9. Row 10, 11 and 12 contains the current, de-
sired level specified by the organization and the desired levels specified by the respondents 
respectively. The last row in Appendix 3, shows the maturity level dimensions used. 
3.2 Secondary Data Source 
The secondary data was collected from relevant information found in the literature. This is 
because secondary data is usually based on existing data which can be used to provide an-
swers to different research questions (Long-Sutehall et. al 2010). The secondary data source 
which is also known as literature review is a powerful source for both quantitative and quali-
tative research because it provides an overview of contributions made by previous research-
ers. If the literature review is adequately conducted the total research framework is set, and 
vice versa (Taylor 2000, 46). 
3.3 Questionnaire Piloting 
The writer conducted a pilot test of the questionnaire on 8th March 2018 at Laurea University 
of Applied Sciences with 12 participants who are non- members of the Organization X. 
The feedback received from the pilot test was used to correct the options in the question-
naire, and determine how to engage participants from Organization X. 
 
During the questionnaire piloting exercise, it was observed that participants exhibited a high 
tendency for anchoring. Therefore, this unwelcomed tendency was prevented in the actual 
interview by scheduling different interview time for each respondent from Organization X.  
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The piloting exercise showed that respondents would be better approached by first, eliciting 
their organization’s desired level of security before the current level. It also shows a need for 
a thorough explanation of the attributes associated to each maturity level before respondents 
could start answering the questionnaire. Hence, the need for additional research instrument 
in form of a poster used to show attributes of each maturity level based on COBIT maturity 
model (see Appendix 1). 
 
In addition, the poster (Appendix 1) addressed situations in which the options given in the in-
terview questionnaire were not applicable to the respondent or the respondent does not have 
knowledge by advising the participants to choose the first option. This is because in the COBIT 
maturity model the first option is indicative of the level of awareness and communication of 
the perspective within the organization.  
 
The piloting exercise was timed to have an overview of the time required for the actual inter-
view. On this basis, the time required during each interview session was set between 20 to 25 
minutes. An important observation during the pilot about the questionnaire was that all par-
ticipants choose only one option for each question as recommended.  
 
Whilst the questionnaire piloting phase was a success because of the useful feedback received 
during the session and additional advice on how to conduct the research better yet there was 
a great lesson learned at the end of the exercise. The filled pilot interview questionnaires re-
ceived from the participants were unintentionally left in the classroom which could make the 
integrity of the data collected to be questionable in an ideal interview.  
 
Therefore, the writer developed a checklist of procedures to be observed during the ideal in-
terview sessions which include unboxing the questionnaire at the beginning of the interview 
and re-boxing it at the end of the interview. 
  
 
Figure 8: Image of filled questionnaires left exposed in the classroom  
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3.4 Interview Limitation 
The writer strongly relied on Creswell (2013) who suggested that several forms and styles can 
be used for the qualitative interview. The qualitative interview often involves personal en-
gagement with challenges of meeting, seeing and being seen. In this case, the writer was pre-
pared to meet and see the participants from Organization X.  
 
However, a meeting in the Organization’s head office in Stockholm could have provided a 
field validation of some of the responses gathered. 
3.5 Ethical Considerations During the interview 
Taylor (2010) outlines four important ethical issues which were considered in this research; 
First, subject consent to participate in the study must be determined without being forced. 
The writer gave all participants the choice to determine their participation in the interview 
and there was no participant under the age of 18 years. 
 
Second, the writer considered the physical and psychological factors which may have a nega-
tive impact on the wellbeing of the participants during the questionnaire design, pilot testing 
phase and the feedback gathered showed no potential harm to participants. 
 
Third, subject privacy was adequately considered, and the questionnaire used for the inter-
views had no personal information. However, organization’s information obtained during the 
interview will be treated with confidentiality. 
 
Finally, special consideration was taken to ensure participants were not misled during the in-
terviews by providing them information relevant to the research exercise. 
 
4 Findings 
This chapter will present the analysis of the data collected during the interviews, and the li-
terature review exercise. This chapter is arranged in two parts, the first part will discuss the 
qualitative theory-guided analysis, and the second part will elaborate on the quantitive data 
collected during the structured interviews. Results of the gaps in the organization X’s ISG pro-
cess will be discussed.  
 
From the literature reviewed, it was found that an effective means of determining the gaps in 
the ISG process of an organization is to assess the maturity level of the processes involved. By 
assessing the maturity level, the organization’s current and desired level of security will be 
determined as well as the gap between the two levels. 
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However, there is no universal approach to assess the maturity and identify gaps in the cur-
rent and desired level of an organization’s governance process. The common approaches 
found in the literature are the capability maturity model, balanced scorecard and the archi-
tectural approach. 
Although, the capability maturity model has different models developed by different professi-
onal institutions such as NIST, ISM3, SABSA, CMMI and ISACA. The literature reviewed shows 
that COBIT maturity model is a more powerful and robust maturity model than other models. 
From the data collected during the interview, the gap between the current level and desired 
levels of Organization X is shown in figure 10 below. During the interview, the data collected 
through the questionnaire was (2 × 6 × 7) representing a total of 84 data points. More specifi-
cally, the 2 represents the current and the desired levels provided by all the respondents dur-
ing the interview, the 6 represents the possible levels specified by the COBIT maturity model, 
and the 7 represents the number of perspectives under consideration.  
In calculating the current level for each perspective, the simple average of the 8 respondents 
under each perspective was used. The desired level value of 3 provided by the organization’s 
board was used for each perspective with a strategic implementation period of 2 years. 
 
 
Figure 9: Radar Chart Showing Gaps in Organization X's Maturity Levels  
 
The Radar Chart of Organization X’s Maturity levels illustrates the current level, desired lev-
els specified by the organization and the desired level specified by the respondents inter-
viewed. As illustrated in Figure 10, the desired level specified by the organization is a con-
stant value with a COBIT maturity level dimension of 3 for each perspective, which is same as 
the desired level of personnel security and incident management specified by the respond-
ents. However, there is a wide gap between the desired levels specified by the organization 
and the respondents in perspectives such as information security policy, asset management 
service level agreement, information security risk and continuity planning. 
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The widest gap between the organization’s current level and desired level exists in the ser-
vice level agreement with 2.62 margin, this is followed by the gap that exists in the incident 
management with 2.37 margin. Similarly, a gap with a margin of 2.25 exists between the cur-
rent and desired level of the security risk management and an equal gap margin of 1.87 exist 
between the organization’s current and desired asset management, and continuity planning. 
The narrowest gap exists in the organization’s current and desired level of information secu-
rity policy with a single maturity level margin. 
Perspective Maturity Level Dimension GAP  
0 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 5 
 
 
       
Information 
Security 
Policy 
 Current 
 
   1.00 
  
 
 
 
Desired 
   
2.00 
Asset Clas-
sification 
  
    1.13 
     
1.87 
Security 
Risk Man-
agement 
 
   0.75 
    
 
 
 
   
2.62 
Incident 
Manage-
ment 
 
 
    0.63 
  
 
 
 
 
   
2.37 
Supplier 
Service De-
livery Man-
agement 
 
   0.38 
  
 
 
 
 
       
 
   
 
2.25 
Continuity 
Planning 
 
  1.13 
  
 
   
1.87 
Personnel 
Security 
 
 1.50 
  
 
   
1.50 
Table 4: Summary of Gaps between Organization X's Current and Desired level of ISG 
 
The implication of the gaps between the current and the desired levels will be further dis-
cussed. The discussion is arranged in the descending order of the identified gap. 
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4.1  Supplier Service Delivery Management 
As shown in the in Figure 9 and Table 4, the maturity level of Organization X’s current sup-
plier service delivery management procedure can be described as non-existence based on the 
COBIT maturity model.  
 
Theoretically, the current level value of 0.38 indicates that the supplier service delivery is 
not in existence at all. Meaning Organization X does not have a standardized and defined pro-
cess and procedures for handling service level agreement. This opinion is shared by 5 out of 
the 8-people interviewed. 
 
The wide gap and the low current maturity level shown in figure 9  cannot be surprising as 
earlier findings of a research conducted  by IT Policy Compliance Group shows that one out of 
five organizations do not properly incorporate service requirements, standards, clear defini-
tion of ownership of information used by the service providers, and specification of infor-
mation access rights into the agreements made with the service providers (Meadows 2014). 
 
The incomplete maturity level can be associated with the organization’s security risk appe-
tite. From the literature reviewed earlier, risk management was identified as one of the ulti-
mate responsibility of the board and senior executives. Risk identification is an important as-
pect of the risk management process, it covers identification of risk associated with external 
parties such as internet service providers, management consultants, cleaning, web developers 
and hosting service providers, outsourced call services, IT services and cloud service provid-
ers.  
 
While an organization with high-risk appetite may not deem it fit to prioritize the establish-
ment of defined processes for managing service level agreements related to third parties and 
other suppliers, organization with low-risk appetite would consider the criticality and the sen-
sitivity of the information involved, information security policy compliance issues, other ser-
vice level agreement terms and conditions and most importantly the regulatory and legal is-
sues. 
 
The service level agreement will among many other terms, define the type of access to be 
given to third parties and other suppliers trading with the organization, termination condi-
tions, the requirement for service continuity, and the rights and conditions for conducting an 
audit of the agreed terms and defined responsibilities. 
 
The cost-benefit of having a defined process for the service level agreement of organization X 
cannot be overemphasized when the risk associated with third parties is taken into considera-
tion. Organization X’s current level -which is below the initial, managed, and defined level of 
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the COBIT maturity model- indicates that it currently lacks the ability to proactively manage 
service providers.  
 
Also, it shows the organization’s lack of transparency in dealing with service providers be-
cause its procedures and processes are not repeatable. It also shows that the organization 
could sometimes be at loggerheads with third parties because of undefined terms and pro-
cesses in its service level agreement. 
 
4.2 Incident Management 
A closer look at Figure 9 and Table 4 show that Organization X’s current level of incident 
management is at the same level with the current Service Level Agreement even though the 
existing gap between the current and the desired level of incident management is less than 
the measured gap under the SLA. 
 
In theory, the current level of the Organization X’s incident management can be classified as 
non-existence based on COBIT maturity level even though five out of 8 people interviewed be-
lieve the incident management maturity level is at ad-hoc level.  
 
The interpretation of this maturity level is that Organization X lacks standard processes and 
procedures as well as defined means of managing incidents. Also, it indicates that Organiza-
tion X does not only lack sophisticated procedures and standards, it lacks the intuitive capa-
bility to effectively manage unforeseen events which might be disruptive to their operations 
across all the five (5) countries by strategically devising means to minimize the impacts and 
restore/maintain service delivery. 
 
Unless a proactive step is taken to bridge the gap between the current and the desired level, 
Organization X may run into huge financial and reputation loss because currently, it lacks 
standardized and defined processes and procedures to minimize the impacts of both internal 
and external threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information assets. 
4.3 Information Security Risk Management 
Findings from this research have shown that Organization X current information security risk 
maturity level is at the non-existence level based on COBIT maturity level with a gap value of 
2.25 from the organization’s desired level. Based on COBIT maturity level, it means that Or-
ganization X does not have standardized and defined processes for managing information se-
curity-related risk.  
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The data collected during the interviews clearly indicates that Organization X has some exist-
ing processes and procedures for managing information security risk because 5 out of 8 re-
spondents believe that Organization X current level is above the COBIT 5 non-existence level 
as 4 out of 8 respondents suggested the organization has some processes and procedures for 
managing information security risk but the processes are not repeatable, and one respondent 
argues that the processes and procedure is repeatable but highly dependent on individual 
knowledge which corresponds to level 2 on the COBIT Maturity level. Only 3 out of 8 respond-
ents agree with the current maturity level. 
 
Since the ultimate responsibility and accountability for the effective management of organi-
zation’s information security risk lies with the Board and the Senior Management as earlier 
suggested by Jones & Ashenden 2005 in chapter 2 then the current maturity level of Organiza-
tion X shows that the Board and the Senior Management are not consistently and sufficiently 
providing strategic direction, developing policy for risk management, deploying appropriate 
personnel and resources to mitigate risk, and championing organization-wide support for man-
aging regulatory and operational risk. Therefore, it can be concluded that the information se-
curity risk of Organization X is poorly governed. 
 
The disadvantages of having a poorly governed information security risk management are 
clear. The organization will not have the capability to deliver benefit to its stakeholders be-
cause a poorly governed information security risk reduces the business value or sometimes ad-
versely destroys the value and causes the organization to miss business opportunities.  
 
The advantages of having a well-governed information security risk management processes 
and procedures include ease of access to funding and gaining trading partners confidence and 
reducing the risk of possible damage to organization’s reputation and profitability arising 
from loss of sensitive information assets.  
 
4.4 Information Security Policy 
This research has shown that Organization X has information security policy in place, but the 
policy documentation is not standard because the current level is evaluated to be at the ini-
tial/ad-hoc level of the COBIT maturity model based on the responses from 8 people inter-
viewed. At least 7 out of 8 respondents confirmed that the organization has an existing infor-
mation security policy in place, but it is not supported with sophisticated and standardized 
procedures and processes.  
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4.5 Continuity Planning 
Findings from this research have shown that Organization X has an existing continuity planning 
process, but the process is not based on any standard framework. This is because the current 
level of Organization X’s continuity planning maturity level assessment indicates that the or-
ganization has already initiated a planning process that will enable it to survive disastrous in-
terruptions and major disasters threatening critical business activities within a restoration 
time objective. 
 
However, there is a gap of one level between Organization X’s current and desired maturity 
level as shown in Figure 9 and Table 4. This shows that Organization X needs to standardize 
its continuity planning process without making it highly dependent on individual knowledge.  
ISO/IEC 27002:2013 recommends that continuity planning procedures and processes are docu-
mented. The implementation of this recommendation is especially important for Organization 
X to bridge the current gap and achieve its desired level. 
 
(Calder & Watkin 2012, 312) emphases the need to test the continuity plan regularly to deter-
mine the effectiveness of the documented procedures and processes. The test can be simu-
lated, walk-through, parallel testing in an alternative site or full interruption testing depend-
ing on the organization’s need based on ISO 27002 recommendation. However, the continuity 
planning document should be updated with the latest procedures and processes required to 
effectively and timely restore critical business activities. ISO/IEC 27031:2011 provides com-
prehensive guidance on continuity planning related to organization’s ICT business processes. 
 
4.6 Asset Classification 
The main control assessed under this perspective was the Organization X’s asset classifica-
tion. The finding from this research has shown that Organization X has an existing asset classi-
fication, but the classification is not based on any standard and it is not supported by any de-
fined procedure and process. 
The responses from all the 8-people interviewed during the research show that the current 
maturity level is at the initial/ad-hoc level on the COBIT maturity model with an approximate 
gap margin of 2 from the desired level.  
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4.7 Personnel Security 
Finding from this research shows that Organization X does not have defined or standardized 
Personnel Security process in place but there is an existing arrangement for personnel secu-
rity. The data collected during the interviews shows that 8 out 8 respondents interviewed be-
lieve there is an existing personnel security arrangement in place while 4 out of 8 respond-
ents pointed that the existing personnel security arrangement is highly dependent on the indi-
vidual knowledge and not standardized. Organization X has a gap of 1.50 margin between its 
current and desired level of maturity. 
 
5 Conclusions 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the main purpose of this thesis is to determine the 
gaps in a non-profit organization’s information security governance process and identify the 
important issues to be considered in developing a roadmap for closing the prevailing identi-
fied gaps.  
This purpose was achieved in chapter 4, where the presentation of the gap between Organiza-
tion X’s current and desired level of ISG process maturity was presented in table 4 based on 
the data collected from 8 respondents interviewed. 
 
Perspective Current Ma-
turity level 
Desired Ma-
turity 
Level 
Needed Actions 
Supplier Service 
Delivery Manage-
ment 
0 3 • Create supplier service delivery 
management procedure 
• Provide awareness and training on 
the supplier service delivery man-
agement procedures to all affected 
unit and officials 
Incident Manage-
ment 
0 3 • Establish incident Management pro-
cesses and procedures  
• provide standard documentation of 
incidents and management proce-
dures 
• Provide awareness and training on 
the processes and procedures to be 
observed when there is an incident 
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Information se-
curity risk  
0 3 • Establish information security risk 
management process and proce-
dures  
• Provide standard documentation of 
information risk-related processes 
and procedures 
• Provide awareness and training to 
all units on the information security 
risk procedures 
Information Se-
curity policy 
1 3 • Establish standard information secu-
rity policy based on business objec-
tive 
• Eliminate reliance on individual 
knowledge and promote organiza-
tion-wide knowledge sharing 
• Explicitly define and document the 
processes and procedures related to 
information security to the extent 
of their applicability in each unit 
 
Asset Classifica-
tion 
1 3 • Classify all asset based on likeli-
hood, impact, sensitivity, and criti-
cality  
• Provide a repeatable process and 
procedure for asset classification  
• Document and eliminate high de-
pendence on individual knowledge 
by providing shared knowledge and 
training to all concerned parties 
Continuity Plan-
ning 
1 3 • Standardize continuity planning pro-
cess and procedures based on best 
practices  
• Eliminate high reliance on individual 
knowledge by providing training and 
knowledge sharing platform for all 
concerned parties  
• Define and document processes and 
procedures 
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Table 5: Summary of Needed Actions to be Implemented to close the existing gaps in the Or-
ganization X’s ISG 
  
Table 5 above illustrates the current and desired level of maturity of Organization X’s ISG as-
sessed based on COBIT maturity model. Organization X’s current maturity level is summarized 
in column 2, the desired maturity level is summarized in column 3 and the required actions 
that needed more focus in the roadmap for closing the existing gaps in Organization X’s ISG 
are summarized in column 4. 
 
As it can be seen in Table 5, This thesis has shown that Organization X is not completely se-
cure from potential breaches because the non-technical processes and procedures needed to 
deter, detect, and prevent its information assets from unauthorized access, disclosure, and 
manipulation are currently not based on any standard practice. 
 
Given the current maturity level of Organization X’s in the three most prioritized perspectives 
in Table 5; supplier service delivery, incident management and information security risk man-
agement which are currently in the non-existence level of the COBIT maturity model, two 
possible conclusions can be drawn; first, it can be concluded that Organization X has not in-
vested enough resources in these three perspectives; second, it can also be concluded that 
Organization X has invested some resources on these three perspectives but the investment 
has not added any positive value to the current profile of the organization and the investment 
lacks proper communication and awareness sponsorship within Organization X. 
 
Since the procedures and plans involved in the remaining four perspectives namely; infor-
mation security policy, asset classification, continuity planning and personnel security were 
not based on any known standards as expressed by the current level of Organization X ma-
turity level under these four perspectives, it can be concluded that Organization X has suffi-
ciently created awareness and communicated its strategic investment on information security 
policy, asset classification, continuity planning and personnel security to all its business units.  
 
Personnel Secu-
rity 
1 3 • Standardize the existing personnel 
security management process and 
procedures 
• Eliminate dependency on individual 
knowledge and promote knowledge 
sharing and training for all con-
cerned parties 
• Establish a defined process and pro-
cedure for personnel security 
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Also, this thesis has shown that for Organization X to attain its desired maturity level, it 
would need to implement the actions listed in the fourth column of Table 5. 
In Chapter 1, the question about the capability of smaller organizations to protect themselves 
from breaches was raised.  
 
Lastly, this thesis has demonstrated that Organization X’s Information Security Governance 
process is yet to mature to its desired level because there are weaknesses that need to be 
fixed in its non-technical processes and procedures. 
 
5.1 Thesis Reflection 
Conducting an academic research using methodological approach can undauntedly influence a 
change of status quo. This has been demonstrated with this thesis through a deliberate learn-
ing attempt aimed at providing solutions to three key research problems related to a non-
profit organization based in the Nordics using the data collected from earlier scholars’ publi-
cations as a point of departure to finding the gaps in the information security governance pro-
cess of the non-profit organization as well as identifying important actions needed to close 
the gaps. 
 
To give more definitive answers to the research problems highlighted in section 1.1 of this re-
port, the writer decided to engage 8 senior managers from the non-profit organization 
through interview sessions which candidly provided the first-hand information used as the pri-
mary data for this thesis. Aside from the data collected for the research purpose during the 
interviews, it was an opportunity to building strong professional network that cut across 5 
countries in the Nordics. Without the interview sessions, the goal of this thesis would have 
been forfeited as all previous literature reviewed were mostly focused on assessing the gap in 
the information security governance process of corporate enterprises established for profit 
making purpose, only few research publications were available on non-profit organization es-
pecially the so called NGOs. 
 
Analyzing the data collected and providing a holistic statistical representation of the data can 
often be daunting, not because of the time and effort that is sometimes required to perform 
these very important aspects of a thesis especially when quantitative research is used, but 
because experience gathered from previous learning endeavors is not often transformed into 
problem solving. This thesis provided an avenue to display knowledge gathered from previous 
course work in the classroom on numerical and statistical data representation and analysis as 
evident in section 4, figure 9 and appendix 3 of this report.  
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The main argument presented at the beginning of this thesis in section 1 was that inadequate 
information security governance often accommodate inconsistencies in the system configura-
tions and it was associated with the breaches experienced by both profit or non-profit organi-
zations irrespective of the size of the organization. The argument was based on the reports of 
information security breaches recorded by big companies such as Yahoo, Equifax, eBay etc. 
Also, the thesis agreed with John Chambers when he concluded that a completely secured 
data center or network does not exist. The main conclusions of this thesis, drawn in section 5, 
does not contradict John Chamber’s earlier conclusion and the initial argument presented at 
the beginning of this thesis. 
  
Perhaps, the greatest challenge in this thesis was maintaining anonymity of the non-profit or-
ganization that was interested in the thesis for the development of its Information security 
governance roadmap. However, through proper consultations with research professionals in-
cluding the thesis supervisor and the representative of the non-profit organization, a solution 
was reached on how to uphold anonymity without undermining the validity and reliability of 
the thesis findings.  
 
While there were several lessons learned during this thesis, two seems highly significant to 
the successful completion of the research process. Firstly, the guidance sessions between the 
thesis writer and the supervisor. The discussions and suggestions from the sessions influenced 
the thesis writer’s style of specifying the needed actions to close the identified gaps in the 
non-profit organization’s information security governance process shown in Table 5. Secondly, 
conducting a pilot of the data collection approach can have a positive influence on the con-
duct of the actual data collection. This thesis was a proof on how piloting can help to raise 
any researchers’ consciousness to salient ethical aspect of research. A narration about the 
writer’s experience during the questionnaire piloting phase was presented in section 3.3. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the experience from the questionnaire piloting phase re-
ported in section 3.3 of this report does not undermine the findings of this thesis because the 
pilot was only a preparatory exercise towards the actual interviews.  
 
5.2 Recommendation 
This thesis would recommend that the current maturity levels already achieved in areas such 
as information security policy, asset classification, continuity planning and most importantly 
personnel security can be improved by standardizing and defining the process and procedures 
involved in each perspective. Organization X should consider the cost and benefit of moving 
from each current level already attained to the next and the desired level. If the cost needed 
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to move to the desired level is more than the benefits, then the current maturity level should 
be sustained until the benefits out-ways the cost. 
 
Also, this thesis would strongly recommend that Organization X should address the gap identi-
fied in its information security policy first as every other perspective assessed in this thesis 
are dependent on how the information security policy is perfectly aligned with the strategic 
business objective of the organization. 
 
Finally, this thesis would recommend a more rigorous process capability assessment of Organi-
zation X ISG supported by field study of all the units in the Nordics to determine if the organi-
zation needs the present desired maturity level in all the perspectives assessed in this thesis. 
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